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A RADIO DISCUSSION OF

WHERE'S BUNKER HILL?

HUGH COLE
LOUIS GOTTSCHALK
ROBERT PLATT

380th BROADCAST IN COOPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY · 168

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no.168-172

JUNE 1, 1941

The University of Chicago

ROUND TABLE

Published weekly. 10 cents a copy; five copies, 25 cents; half-year subscription, 26 issues, one dollar. Published by the University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois. Entered as second-class matter January 3, 1939, at the post office at Chicago, Illinois, under the Act of March 3, 1879.

No. 168

NOTE

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WHERE'S BUNKER HILL?

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST*

HUGH M. COLE, Instructor in History and Lecturer in the Institute of Military Studies

LOUIS GOTTSCHALK, Professor of Modern History

ROBERT S. PLATT, Professor of Geography

[ALL THREE ARE MEMBERS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO FACULTY]

* A radio discussion broadcast from the University of Chicago, over the Red Network of the National Broadcasting Company, Sunday, June 1, 1941, at 1:30 P.M., Central Daylight Saving Time.

The ROUND TABLE, oldest educational program continuously on the air, is broadcast entirely without a script. Subjects are chosen because of their social, political, or economic significance. The program has no "ax to grind." In the selection of speakers, the effort is to provide a balanced discussion by participants who have special competence and knowledge. The opinion of each speaker is his own and in no way involves the responsibility of either the University of Chicago or the National Broadcasting Company.

WHERE'S BUNKER HILL?

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Gentlemen, two significant speeches have been made in the last few days which are pertinent to our discussion. In his "fireside chat" President Roosevelt mentioned several possible areas—possible "Bunker Hills"—which we may have to defend without waiting to see the whites of the enemies' eyes; and, commenting on the President's speech, Mr. Lindbergh[1] said that we would fight if the Germans were to take the Fernando de Noronha Islands off the coast of South America, just as he thought Hitler might fight if we were to take the Cape Verde Islands off the coast of Africa.[2]

Cole, as a student of military affairs, what do you think of the idea of defending certain areas without waiting for the enemy to attack?

MR. COLE: The spot on the map where the first shot will be fired is a matter of relatively minor detail, which will be largely determined by the general military policy of the United States. In other words, will this country fight on the offensive or defensive?

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[1] *President Roosevelt spoke Tuesday, May 27. Mr. Lindbergh, in a speech in Philadelphia, May 29, charged the President had gone beyond "even Hitler" and suggested it was time for the country "to turn to new policies and a new leadership."*

[2] *The Fernando Noronha Islands lie 225 miles northeast of Natal and Cape Sao Roque, Brazil.*

MERCATOR'S GREENLAND



All of us should remember that our foreign policy is defensive; that it is intended to keep the European war away from the Western Hemisphere. However, our military policy, by distinction, may be offensive in order to implement a defensive foreign policy.

Platt, as a geographer, would you agree with this view?

MR. PLATT: Yes, I agree with you entirely, Cole. In our discussion of the President's speech we don't need certain kinds of geographic information—for instance, that people are white in the Azores and black in the Cape Verde Islands, or that they have bananas in the Canaries or radishes in Greenland; but we do need more geographic facts about how the places are located and how important they are to us—how they fit into our national problems.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: If you took your right hand and opened it with the palm toward you and stretched out your fingers, you would have approximately the geographical situation which we are

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to discuss. The small finger would represent Greenland; the next finger would represent Iceland; the middle finger would represent the Atlantic islands—particularly the Azores, the Canaries, and the Cape Verde Islands; the index finger would represent Dakar in Africa; and the thumb would represent Natal in Brazil, on the "hump" of South America. (*See illustration, page 9.*)

Suppose we take them one at a time and discuss their strategic and geographic importance in relation to the freedom of the seas and the Battle of the Atlantic. Platt, what about the potentialities of Greenland?

MR. PLATT: Of course, I don't think much of your map, but I guess it will do. Your little finger is Greenland, and Greenland is a huge island—almost continental.[3]

MR. GOTTSCHALK: There is a general misconception of the size of Greenland because of the Mercator projections on maps, which extend the northern area of the world. Doesn't it look bigger on most maps than it actually is? (*See illustration, page 3.*)

MR. PLATT: It isn't so huge as it looks on some maps, but it is three times as large as Texas and has a coast line about as long as that of the United States. So we have plenty to think about. It is

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[3] *Greenland has a total area of 735,000 square miles (Texas has an area of 265,000), but of this only 31,000 is ice-free land, along the coasts. In 1930 the population was just under 17,000, of whom 500 were Danes, the rest natives. With the capitulation of Denmark to Germany in April, 1940, trade between Greenland and Denmark stopped and the United States undertook to provide necessary foodstuffs for the island's inhabitants. On April 9, 1941, just one year after the German invasion of Denmark and Norway, the Danish Minister to the United States, Henrik de Kauffman, acting "on behalf of the King of Denmark," signed an agreement with the United States under which America took over the protection of the Danish colony and was given the right to construct and maintain naval and air bases in Greenland.*

certainly on the American side of the Atlantic and we need to do something about it.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Do you know anything about the strategic advantages of Greenland, Cole?

MR. COLE: There has been much debate lately as to the relative importance of Greenland as a naval base and a base for aerial attack. Generally, it is now conceded that Greenland could be used for an attack against us by air, since the southern part is useful for aerial bases. But there is something else: Greenland not only protects the entry to our coast but is also strategically placed astride the supply route to Britain.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I don't think we need to spend very much time on Greenland, for the simple reason that we are already there. Whether or not we can maintain ourselves there for any length of time remains to be seen.

I should like to pass on to the next finger on my hand-map. You remember that I am using the palm as the United States and the five fingers as the areas extended out into the Atlantic. Now the second finger would represent Iceland. What are the geographical factors that interest us in Iceland?

MR. PLATT: Certainly the United States has as much interest in Iceland as in Greenland. Iceland is only 200 miles from Greenland, and yet Iceland very often is not considered as in the Western Hemisphere.[4]

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I have seen maps, however, that put Iceland in the Western Hemisphere.

MR. PLATT: That just shows how arbitrary and academic Eastern and Western Hemisphere ideas are.

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[4] *Iceland, with a total area of 40,000 square miles and a population of 110,000, was occupied by British troops (along with the Faroe Islands) after the German invasion of Norway and Denmark.*

MR. GOTTSCHALK: What you mean is that it is up to the man who makes the map.

MR. PLATT: Yes.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: There is no scientific way of determining what is the Eastern and what is the Western Hemisphere?

MR. PLATT: There may have been some excuse for distinguishing them when the seas were barriers, but now that the seas are highways that does not have any significance at all.

MR. COLE: Strategically, Iceland is less important to us at the moment than Greenland, since Iceland has been occupied and defended by large contingents of British troops since April of last year, since it is in the patrol area of the British fleet operating from the Faroe Islands, and since it is also already patrolled by elements of the R.A.F.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Since Iceland and Greenland are not really of vital concern, because they are already under the control of England and the United States, I would like to pass to another point the President made in connection with the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands, which are represented by the middle finger on my map. What strategic and geographical attributes of these Atlantic islands would you like to mention?

MR. PLATT: Those islands don't have much in common except that, whereas Iceland and Greenland are steppingstones between northern Europe and America, these other islands are steppingstones between southern Europe and America: the Azores were formerly a hopping-off place for the Pan-American Airways crossing the Atlantic; Cape Verde, for the Italians, who still fly across to South America.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The Azores are right about in the middle of the Atlantic and the Cape Verde Islands are pretty close to Africa.

MR. PLATT: Not very close: 800 miles or more offshore in one case and 300 in the other.[5]

MR. GOTTSCHALK: In any case, the Cape Verde Islands are closer to Africa than the Azores are to Europe or the United States. Do you think that any invasion of the United States or of the Western Hemisphere might come from the Azores or the Cape Verde Islands?

MR. COLE: I think that they would obviously be the first step for such an invasion, but I believe there are two strategic reasons why we should concern ourselves with these Atlantic islands: first, because they are garrisoned by Portugal and Spain—in neither case, that is, garrisoned by a strong naval power, and therefore up for grabbing by whichever of two combatants wants to occupy them; and, in the second place, I believe the Atlantic islands to be of strategic importance because they lie athwart the British lifeline, the so-called "reserve line" across Africa, since England can no longer go through the Mediterranean to ship through them.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: In other words, they are important in the Battle of the Atlantic even if they are only potentially important in the case of the invasion of the Western Hemisphere.

MR. COLE: Quite so—except that we do not want to forget that they are *potentially* important in the battle of the Western Hemisphere!

MR. PLATT: I think it is very interesting that the President mentioned the Azores and the Cape Verde Islands and did not men-

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[5] *The Azores lie due west of Portugal, by whom they are owned, and are about 1,000 square miles in total area, with a total population of 230,000. The Cape Verde Islands, also owned by Portugal, lying west and slightly north of Dakar, have an area of some 1,500 square miles (like the Azores, in a widely scattered group) and a population of 162,000.*

tion the Canaries and Madeira. You spoke of the Spanish and the Portuguese. The Azores and the Cape Verde Islands are both Portuguese islands. Why should he have mentioned just the Azores and Cape Verdes and not also the Canaries?[6]

MR. COLE: I believe there was a good reason for passing over the Canaries, specifically because they are Spanish, but more importantly because we have information that the largest port in the Canaries, Santa Cruz de la Palma, has already been garrisoned very heavily by Spain and as early as 1937 was a base of operation for German submarines.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Do you think we could hold the Azores, provided we got there first? You said that they would fall to anybody who got there first. Can we hold them?

MR. COLE: Let me put it this way: Portugal has a very poor army. Army reorganization in Portugal was begun in 1938. There is no army, and specifically there is no air force. Portugal, a friend of England, might hand the Azores to us. Could we hold it without sufficient aerial power to protect a landing fleet and the line of communication from the Azores, if the United States troops were there, back to our furthermost bases in the United States?

MR. PLATT: I think it is significant that the President mentioned the islands which were farther away from the Continent, farther than any jump Germany has taken so far. He did not mention the Canaries—which are as close to the African mainland as

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[6] *The Canary Islands, under Spanish rule, are, at their closest point to the mainland, less than a hundred miles from the settlement of Tarfaya, in the Spanish colony of Rio de Oro. The area of the islands is nearly 3,000 square miles and the population is around 635,000. The Madeira Islands, under Portugal, lie a little over 400 miles from the French Moroccan coast, southwest of Gibraltar. They are small in area (only 300 square miles), but have a population of 210,000.*

HAND-MAP OF STRATEGIC OUTPOSTS

MAP BASED ON GOODE'S INTERRUPTED HOMOLOGRAPHIC EQUAL-AREA PROJECTION—DISTANCES IN STATUTE MILES

Crete is to Greece, and therefore something we could assume that Germany could get over to very easily.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Your point, then, is that we might be able to fight at the Azores as a sort of Bunker Hill, but retreat from it eventually just as we did from Bunker Hill. Are we agreed on that?

MR. PLATT: If it turns out that Germany can hop that far.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: If Germany can hop that far, and if she can bring enough air-power to bear against our fleet-power.

MR. COLE: Gentlemen, I should like to enter this one addendum, and that is that Germany has been able to do the job thus far. We had better, just from the point of view of security and strategy, give Germany the benefit of the doubt.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: For the moment, at least, let's think of the Azores problem as one which has very many strategic complications that we cannot settle on the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE. Let's go on to Dakar, which is the index finger on my map, and which the President mentioned.[7]

MR. PLATT: It is interesting that he mentioned it in a different way; that he did not speak of it as being something we would have to attend to. Dakar, on the hump of Africa opposite South America, is in just as good a position as the Cape Verde Islands for a hop-off to South America, and therefore is just as important to us in various respects, yet with a different strategic importance.[8]

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[7] *In his speech May 27 the President said: "They [the Nazis] also have the armed power at any moment to occupy Spain and Portugal; and that threat extends not only to French North Africa and the western end of the Mediterranean, but also to the Atlantic fortress of Dakar and to the island outposts of the New World—the Azores and Cape Verde Islands."*

[8] *Dakar lies at the westernmost point in Africa, 1,800 miles southwest of Gibraltar. The city has a population of 70,000 (of whom 6,000*

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Dakar is on the hump of Africa opposite Natal on the hump of South America.

MR. COLE: I should like to underline the strategic difference between the operation of the United States forces against Dakar and against the Azores. Dakar must be studied in reference to the three great principles that our great theoretician, Admiral Mahan, laid down for the use of naval bases. He said that, in the first place, naval bases depend on strategy and geography; in the second place, they are no good unless you can hold the bases—that is, unless you have security once you have landed your troops there; in the third place, they are of little use to you unless you can keep the supply lines open from the United States to that base.[9]

Remember that in the case of Dakar it is quite a different problem than in the case of the Azores.

MR. PLATT: That is, you might say that Roosevelt had three separate reasons for not making much of Dakar: that it would be so much harder to hold; that certainly it is not in the Western Hemisphere and therefore his audience did not want to hear that we need to go to Africa; and, also, that he was emphasizing sea lanes and islands as important.

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are Europeans). Dakar is protected by strong coastal defenses (including now the dismounted 15-inch guns of the French battleship "Richelieu"), several land airports, and a seaplane base. The port facilities include three commercial docks (with 7,000 feet of quayage), a naval dock and arsenal, a torpedo-boat basin, and a dry dock. Dakar has long been a coaling and provisioning station for French steamships in the South American trade. It is the capital of French West Africa, which includes a population of 14,500,000 natives and 25,000 Europeans, and is the only seaport in the territory offering safe anchorage to the largest ships.

[9] *Admiral Albert T. Mahan (1840–1914), whose volume "The Influence of Sea Power upon History" is regarded as one of the great classics of naval writing.*

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I should like to point out another reason why the President probably did not mention it, and that is a political reason. You mentioned the Canary Islands as having been omitted because they belonged to Spain. Dakar still belongs to France, and France fought once to defend it against the English, and she probably would fight again to defend it against the United States and the English.

MR. COLE: I think that is very important, because I believe that is Hitler's idea exactly. He has just recently allowed the French possession of large portions of the one-time bomber fleet. He has given them great impetus to defend the empire, and I think he intends that the French shall defend Dakar.

MR. PLATT: I think that comes in, and I think we have to look at it as a French possession which also, being on the mainland, can be backed up by a German army if necessary.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Then, looking again at my hand, we seem to be agreed that the first two fingers represent points fairly strategic to the United States and that the second two fingers do not represent points that are quite as advantageous.

I should like to pass on now to my thumb, which represents South America. What do you think of the potential geographical and strategic points there?

MR. PLATT: The importance of Dakar and the Cape Verde Islands naturally depends on their relation to South America. So the question is: Can we defend ourselves in South America? One of the things that is very evident to me in connection with the Chaco and the Amazon lowlands is that Germany can operate there if they can operate overland in other places, once they are there.

MR. COLE: I think you have made the jump somewhat hurriedly from Dakar to Natal, on the hump of South America. That jump is going to be very difficult to make. I believe it can be made.

Air France—which once flew this route—flew biweekly between Paris and Dakar, and once a week from Dakar to Natal. It could be done.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: How many hours?

MR. COLE: Bombers could fly from Dakar to Natal in from seven to eight hours. It is very important that in 1938 whole bombing squadrons were flown from Paris to Dakar and undertook tactical exercises. In other words, the steps from Paris (where the Germans are now located) to Dakar (where the French "allies" are now located) and then across to Natal are not such a big gap as we sometimes believe.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: It would seem to me, then, that we've got to take into consideration that important point: that, while it is possible for bombers to get across there, it isn't as easy for them to get across between Dakar and Natal as it would be to get to the Azores or some of these other points we have been discussing. Natal does not seem to be a good Bunker Hill for the simple reason that the Germans cannot get there. Or can they, Cole?

MR. COLE: I think that is a great misassumption in this country—that they can't get there. We have to work on the thesis (and here I return to our initial military policy from which all this stems) that if there is a possibility that they can get there we have to defend ourselves against that possibility, no matter how slight it may seem at the moment.

MR. PLATT: Isn't it evident that our strength is not on land as much as Germany's strength is on land; that once Germany is in South America it can go places; that to get to South America across that gap is a very different matter as long as we control the seas in cooperation with the British?

MR. COLE: That is important. I would like to underline it. There are two ways in which Germany can cross the seas. She can



do it in time of war as a belligerent; and if England disappears from the South Atlantic, she can send her storm troopers—the initial "blitz" men—across as peaceful tradesmen, and that is going to be very difficult to deal with in case England disappears from the South Atlantic.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: It probably is obvious to all of us—and I hope it is obvious to other people—that if the English navy disappears it will not be as difficult for the Germans to get to Natal or other parts of South America as it will be if the English navy is in a fighting capacity.

But supposing they get to Natal. Is it going to make any vital difference to us, Platt? How are they going to get from South America to points that are of greater interest to us?

MR. PLATT: I have looked over that part of South America with particular attention to the matter of getting around and getting over either by air or by land.

MR. COLE: You flew over much of this territory, didn't you?

MR. PLATT: A great deal of it: up the Amazon, and around the eastern coast as far as the Chaco on different occasions and in different planes, and I certainly saw plenty of operations with European planes as well as with Pan-American planes.



MR. COLE: In a case like this I always like to look at what the Germans think about such a problem. The Germans think very specifically that they can operate through such terrain as the Amazonian jungles and the kind of country which you have mentioned in the Chaco. They believe it can be done. They have studied the thing very carefully, and actually they were responsible for many of the operations in the Chaco war.[10]

MR. PLATT: I don't think you can say that the Chaco is like the Amazon jungle. They are two different places, but there is a great deal of variety in each of them. I have seen ox carts in use in the Chaco on fairly good roads. If ox carts can operate, certainly tanks can. I have seen at the mouth of the Amazon open areas through which people can ride on horseback with no roads at all.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I take it, then, that your point is that it is going to be very difficult for an enemy force in South America to use that as a land base for further operations.

MR. PLATT: Difficult to use it without the kind of German progress that we are now familiar with: by water and land, by little

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[10] *The Chaco war was fought in the mid-thirties between Bolivia and Paraguay and finally ended with a peace agreement signed in 1938.*

hops. Certainly the Amazon basin is subject to being crossed by a few very easy little hops—much easier than the Aegean Islands.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I don't understand whether you think Natal is a good or a bad base for the Germans.

MR. PLATT: It is a good place to start.

MR. COLE: Just recently the Brazilian government began to build a number of airfields in the Natal area large enough for military bombing planes. They already have eighteen fields and are going to build two more, but these fields are not yet protected by antiaircraft guns, nor are they protected by bomber and interceptor squadrons in any large number. What does it mean? It means exactly what it has meant elsewhere: that Germany can use other people's bases.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: In discussing this question of potential Bunker Hills, it seems to me important that we answer this question, too: Is Natal a better and easier base for the United States than it would be for the Germans? What do you think of that, Platt?

MR. PLATT: Of course we can start there. We know that Germany can cross to Natal if there is no opposition on the American coast. Their planes are already doing it. The Italians have had a fairly regular service. We know also that it would be very difficult for them to come across in force if there is considerable opposition.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Therefore we have a fairly good chance of maintaining ourselves in Natal against German opposition.

MR. PLATT: If we put up the opposition.

MR. COLE: I should question that, except with reference to putting up the opposition. In the last war, for example, it was always said that barbed wire was impenetrable by moving troops, advancing infantry. If the barbed-wire position was backed up by infantry, you could not go through it. But if it wasn't backed up by

adequate forces, then the barbed wire could be blown out of the way. That is exactly the position of the Brazilian coast.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: I think you gentlemen agree in maintaining that Natal would be easier for us to defend than some of the other points we have been talking of particularly.

MR. COLE: I would agree there.

MR. PLATT: And for the reason that it is on the American side of the Atlantic; that our strength is on our Atlantic strength now; and that our contacts are water contacts.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Good! That brings up another point that I want to make. Again referring to the palm of my hand as the United States and the fingers as these potential Bunker Hills, there are spaces between the fingers—in other words, the ocean. Don't you think the ocean itself might be a potential Bunker Hill, Cole?

MR. COLE: It might well be, except that I should like to have you put one hand above the other to represent the air as superior in another dimension to old-style, amphibian operation: namely, troops and ships. We must add the third element, in the air.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: The air above the ocean, in other words.

MR. COLE: Exactly so!

MR. PLATT: And that thumb of yours ought not to be one but a whole group, a cluster, because the South American countries are like islands that reach one another by water and are reached from the United States by water.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That is very interesting, because most people, I am sure—even the intelligent audience of the University of Chicago ROUND TABLE—are convinced that South America is connected with the United States by land, and that therefore we get there by land; that we don't get there by water, or don't necessarily have to get there by water.

MR. PLATT: We can be sure that Germany, once over there, could move by land, as they have done in other places, but we never have and are not likely to, in that our contacts are water contacts from one country to another.

MR. COLE: It is true, though, that a corps of United States engineers has worked out a great plan of strategic highways down through Central America and Mexico. They would like to have this strategic highway finished in a couple of years in case our fleet should be interested in the Pacific.

MR. PLATT: And that is just a highway to Panama, so far. Beyond Panama there is a great part of the isthmus over which no one travels, and over which no one is likely to travel. The Isthmus of Panama looks as if the Americas are tied together as one body of land. In practical usage it is a cluster of islands, one being reached from another by water.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: That is extremely interesting to me, because it indicates that the question of the freedom of the seas is as vital to us in Western Hemisphere defense as it is in connection with the defense of England. That reminds me that the President said in his "fireside chat" that in all of American history, North, Central, and South American history has been inevitably tied up with those words—"freedom of the seas."[11] You think, of course, that that is absolutely true.

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[11] *The President said: "Since 1799, when our infant navy made the West Indies and the Carribean and the Gulf of Mexico safe for American ships; since 1804 and 1805, when we made all peaceful commerce safe from the depredations of the Barbary pirates; since the War of 1812, which was fought for the preservation of sailors' rights; since 1867, when our sea-power made it possible for the Mexicans to expel the French army of Louis Napoleon, we have striven and fought in defense of freedom of the seas—for our own shipping, for the commerce of our sister-republics, for the right of all nations to use the highways of world-trade, and for our own safety."*

MR. PLATT: I think he was properly trying to guide us away from the idea of a solid body of land, of the Western Hemisphere as something cut off from the rest; the Monroe Doctrine as covering a solid body of land that does not have to have the oceans attached to it.

MR. COLE: We should, however, mention that there are a great many people in this country who believe that, since the southernmost part of South America is economically most closely tied up with Europe, we should surrender this territory, allow the Nazis to land, and then hope that we can stop them in the Amazonian jungles. What do you think of this view?

MR. PLATT: The question is: Where is our best line of defense? In the South Atlantic between Dakar and Natal—or in South America at the Amazon basin? I see no hope of stopping the Germans after they are once across the whole of southeastern South America.

MR. COLE: I quite agree with you, Platt, because the experience in the Chaco has shown that you can move through this area with just the weapons that the Germans have: automatic arms, planes, and the whole thesis of penetration.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: There is the question of the Pacific. I don't think we can consider our discussion complete until we mention the Pacific. Do you think it is possible for us to defend both the Atlantic and the Pacific?

MR. PLATT: It is certainly a matter that is of interest to us. The Atlantic and the Pacific are the highways of contact which we need.

MR. COLE: I should like to add, though, that the whole discussion of military policy—Shall we fight in the Atlantic? Shall we fight in the Pacific?—depends on one other factor, and that is the availability of matériel of warfare. Until we have the guns, the ships,

and the planes to fight in both areas, we may well have to concentrate either in the Atlantic or in the Pacific, and surrender for the time being one area or the other.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: Do you think that we can possibly defend both the Atlantic and the Pacific? Should the Bunker Hill start in the Pacific, where do you think we would come out?

MR. COLE: I think possibly we would have to let the British take care of the Atlantic while we concentrated our efforts in the Pacific.

MR. GOTTSCHALK: There have been many points of minor dispute, but on the whole we three have agreed that the United States has a vital and legitimate interest in the Atlantic islands and in Dakar in Africa. We also seem to be agreed that, if the United States fights, the advantages will be on the American side in Greenland, Iceland, and South America, but on the German side in the Atlantic islands and Dakar. We are still further agreed that it is desirable to keep the potential enemy as far across the ocean as possible, at least until we have sufficient means to carry the offensive closer to Europe. Meanwhile, it is important that the United States help to keep the seas open and free of access to American and English vessels, and that holds true whether one thinks in terms of defense of England or of defense of the Western Hemisphere alone.

SUGGESTED READINGS

BALDWIN, HANSON W., *United We Stand!* New York: Whittlesey House, 1941. *A general survey of American defense and the defense of the Western Hemisphere, with an evaluation of our armed forces and an estimate of the problems they may have to face, written by one of America's best-known military authorities.*

ELLIOTT, A. R., "United States Strategic Bases in the Atlantic," *Foreign Policy Reports*, January 15, 1941. *A general survey.*

———, "United States Defense Outposts in the Pacific," *Foreign Policy Reports*, March 15, 1941. *A general survey.*

KNOX, FRANK, with PRATT, FLETCHER, "Ships, Men, and Bases," *Saturday Evening Post*, April 5, 1941. *A survey by the Secretary of the Navy of American naval power, with attention to the areas of possible American combat.*

LIMPUS, LOWELL M., *Twentieth Century Warfare.* New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, 1940. *A layman's handbook of the tactics and strategy, methods and weapons, which America (or any other power) must use wherever its Bunker Hill may be fought.*

PRATT, FLETCHER; VAGTS, ALFRED; ELIOT, GEORGE FIELDING; WERNER, MAX; and POSSONY, S. T., "Can America Be Invaded?" *New Republic*, May 12, 1941. *Letters from military writers and commentators on the possibility of invasion.*

STALEY, EUGENE, "The Myth of the Continents," *Foreign Affairs*, April, 1941. *A delineation of the narrowness of natural boundaries in days of rapid communication and the growth of air-power.*

"Take the Aggressive!" *New Republic*, May 26, 1941. *An appeal for the seizure of Dakar, the occupation of Vichy-held islands in this hemisphere, and the taking-over of the Canary and Cape Verde islands.*

OBJECTIVE QUESTIONS FOR EXAMINATION

The answers to the following questions may be found in the text of the broadcast, and page references are provided to assist in locating the answers.

*

1. Where are the Fernando Noronha Islands? Page 2.
2. How does Greenland compare in size with an American state like Texas? Page 4.
3. The waters between Greenland and Iceland are how wide? Page 5.
4. When did British troops occupy Iceland? Page 6.
5. How far from Europe do the Azores Islands lie? How far from Africa are the Cape Verde Islands? Page 7.
6. What other South Atlantic islands have been suggested as possible jumping-off places for attack against the Western Hemisphere? Page 8.
7. In 1937 what port in these islands was a base for German submarines? Page 8.
8. List the three principles laid down by Admiral Mahan as to the use of naval bases. Page 11.
9. What estimate is given for the flying time of bombers operating between Dakar, French West Africa, and Natal, Brazil? Page 13.
10. The Brazilian government has built and is building how many airfields? Page 16.

QUESTIONS FOR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

The following questions of wider scope, intended for discussion, are suggested by the broadcast, and answers may be found in the literature on the subject listed in the section "Suggested Readings," found on page 21.

*

1. Where do you think America may fight another Bunker Hill?
2. Argue for or against the thesis that the United States should oppose Axis forces only at the "bulge" of Brazil. List the military, economic, and geographic factors involved and comment on the probabilities and possibilities of successful defense at that point.
3. "A defensive foreign policy may have to be implemented by an offensive military policy." Comment on this statement and discuss its implications for the United States today.
4. How do you believe the situation in the Pacific might modify the conclusions of the ROUND TABLE experts about the locale of a possible future American Bunker Hill?
5. What do you understand by the term "freedom of the seas"? How far, and in what ways, do you believe the United States should act to maintain this freedom?
6. Considering the points laid down by the experts on this ROUND TABLE broadcast, what immediate course of action, if any, do you believe the United States should follow in relation to the European war?

The Listeners' Round Table . . . .

Letters to the ROUND TABLE *frequently contain interesting and illuminating sidelights on the subject matter discussed on the air. These comments are from letters received following the broadcast discussion of "Polls and the Crisis" May 25, 1941.*

*

Risk

It seems to me that one of the speakers might have pursued the discussion of the risk involved in aiding Britain and the public's understanding of the term.

It might have been pointed out, for instance, that during the last four months the percentage of people favoring aid, even at the risk of war, has decreased from 68 per cent in January to 67 per cent in April and to 62 per cent in May.

Would it not be logical to conclude that the percentage favoring taking the risk is decreasing as the risk becomes more and more real and more and more apparent to greater numbers of the people?

H. H., Illinois

*

The South

The participants in the Gallup poll analysis seemed to be unanimous in their opinion that those who favor going to war now are a better-informed or better-educated sample of the people polled.

If the sample is a fair cross-section of the population, how do you account for the largest percentage being in the southern states, where the people are the least educated and therefore the least informed on public questions? Also, they have the least to lose by a change in the *status quo*.

A Listener, Kansas

*

Award

Having long considered the ROUND TABLE discussions the very cream of radio broadcasts on educational subjects, I was not surprised to read of its award. Truly the public is more intelligent than it is credited with being.

H. McG., New Jersey

*

Contradiction

I was amused to hear Dr. Gallup—who should by now be pretty well rehearsed in his answers to criticisms of his polls—contradict himself when discussing the question of seeking to investigate the future.

At one point he insisted that hypothetical questions about the future are necessary, explaining something to the effect that people's actions at any time are likely to be conditioned by what they expect will happen in the future.

But when it was suggested that his polls should inquire about how many "filled coffins" the American people are willing to risk and about how long the war might last, Dr. Gallup came up with something about the chief role of his polls being to discover the public's opinions on the present. He even turned around and said that answers about the future and about hypothetical questions are unreliable!

T. R., Indiana

*

Doubter

I have just listened to your radio broadcast, and I accept your invitation to comment thereon. I think the Gallup poll is bunk in spite of your very apparent attempt this afternoon to build up its trustworthiness. I am not alone in distrusting the polls. If you really meant to *discuss* the polls, why did you have as speakers only those who believe in them?

T. E. W., Maine

WHO DO YOU KNOW IN

Bloemfontein
Papeete
Ashkhabad
Punakha

?

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LISTS

OF 1938–39 TRANSCRIPTS STILL IN PRINT WILL BE SENT UPON REQUEST. STUDENTS AND TEACHERS WILL FIND THESE ISSUES TO BE VALUABLE COMMENTARIES UPON EVENTS OF THE PERIOD.

Nos.

1940

98. *The Jews*
101. *Tariff Walls*
104. *Is America's Economic Frontier Closed?*
105. *Must the World Unite?*
106. *Can We Protect America?*
108. *The Archbishops Look at America*
111. *Where's That War Boom?*
113. *Blitzkrieg, May, 1940*
114. *America and the Peacemongers*
115. *Babies Cost Money*
117. *Have We Time to Think?*
119. *America's Capacity to Arm*
120. *Economic Union for the Americas*
121. *Civil Liberties and the Fifth Column*
122. *M-Day and America*
124. *Should America Conscript Men Now?*
125. *The New France*
126. *What Really Happened at Havana?*
128. *Blitzkrieg on Britain*
129. *Should America Aid Britain?*
130. *Should America Feed Europe?*
131. *Can Germany Conquer Latin America?*
132. *Conscript Wealth, Too?*
134. *Will Hitler Attack America Next?*
137. *Warmongers and Appeasers*

Nos.

138. *Polls and the Election*
140. *World Revolution*
141. *Art and Our Warring World*
142. *The Soviet Union and America*
143. *Is Hitler Revolutionizing Britain?*
144. *Where Are Those 50,000 Planes?*
146. *1951: The Next Decade in Education*

1941

147. *More Aid to Britain Now?*
148. *Is This Our War?*
149. *Morale: First Line of Defense?*
150. *Can Capitalism Defend America?*
152. *Can the Americas Be Invaded?*
153. *Guns or Butter?*
154. *Dilemma in the Far East*
155. *How to Fight Nazi Propaganda*
156. *The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*
157. *Strikes and National Defense*
158. *Defense Economics*
159. *Should America Convoy to Britain?*
160. *Balkan Blitzkrieg*
161. *War Aims and Peace Aims*
162. *Which Road for America?*
163. *Lessons from Europe's War*
164. *The Effect of the Blitzkrieg on the Economic Order*
165. *Defense and America's Health*
166. *Roosevelt* vs. *Hitler*
167. *Polls and the Crisis.* May 25

ALL ROUND TABLE TRANSCRIPTS CONTAIN ADDED FACTUAL MATERIAL IN THE FORM OF GRAPHS, MAPS, PICTOGRAPHS, FOOTNOTES, BIBLIOGRAPHIES, ETC.

ROUND TABLE NETWORK

2:30 P.M. EASTERN DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME

City	Call Letters	Kilocycles	City	Call Letters	Kilocycles
Boston, Mass.	WNAC	1260	Portland, Me.	WCSH	970
Buffalo, N.Y.	WBEN	930	Providence, R.I.	WJAR	920
New York, N.Y.	WEAF	660	Rochester, N.Y.	WHAM	1180
Philadelphia, Pa.	KYW	1060	Schenectady, N.Y.	WGY	810
Pittsburgh, Pa.	WCAE	1250	Wilmington, Del.	WDEL	1150

1:30 P.M. EASTERN STANDARD TIME

Allentown, Pa.	WSAN	1470	Johnstown, Pa.	WJAC	1400
Altoona, Pa.	WFBG	1340	Lakeland, Fla.	WLAK	1340
Asheville, N.C.	WISE	1400	Lima, Ohio	WLOK	1240
Atlanta, Ga.	WSB	750	Miami, Fla.	WIOD	610
Baltimore, Md.	WFBR	1300	Nashville, Tenn.	WSM	650
Charleston, S.C.	WTMA	1250	Norfolk, Va.	WTAR	790
Charlotte, N.C.	WSOC	1240	Raleigh, N.C.	WPTF	680
Cleveland, Ohio	WTAM	1100	Richmond, Va.	WMBG	1380
Columbia, S.C.	WIS	560	Savannah, Ga.	WSAV	1340
Columbus, Ohio	WCOL	1230	Springfield, Ohio	WIZE	1340
Dayton, Ohio	WING	1410	Tampa, Fla.	WFLA	970
Detroit, Mich.	WWJ	950	Toledo, Ohio	WSPD	1370
Florence, S.C.	WOLS	1230	Washington, D.C.	WRC	980
Grand Rapids, Mich.	WOOD	1300	Winston-Salem, N.C.	WSJS	600
Greenville, S.C.	WFBC	1330	Zanesville, Ohio	WHIZ	1240
Jacksonville, Fla.	WJAX	930			

1:30 P.M. CENTRAL DAYLIGHT SAVING TIME

Chicago, Ill.	WMAQ	670	Memphis, Tenn.	WMC	790
Fort Wayne, Ind.	WGL	1450			

12:30 P.M. CENTRAL STANDARD TIME

Amarillo, Texas	KGNC	1440	Milwaukee, Wis.	WTMJ	620
Birmingham, Ala.	WBRC	960	Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn.	KSTP	1500
Bismarck, N.D.	KFYR	550	New Orleans, La.	WSMB	1350
Bristol, Tenn.	WOPI	1490	Oklahoma City, Okla.	WKY	930
Duluth, Minn., and Superior, Wis.	WEBC	1320	Omaha, Neb.	WOW	590
El Paso, Texas	KTSM	1380	Pittsburg, Kans.	KOAM	810
Evansville, Ind.	WGBF	1280	Rochester, Minn.	KROC	1340
Fargo, N.D.	WDAY	970	St. Cloud, Minn.	KFAM	1450
Jackson, Miss.	WJDX	1300	St. Louis, Mo.	KSD	550
Kansas City, Mo.	WDAF	610	Shreveport, La.	KTBS	1480
Kingsport, Tenn.	WKPT	1400	Sioux Falls, S.D.	KSOO	1140
Laurel, Miss.	WAML	1340	Springfield, Mo.	KGBX	1260
Little Rock, Ark.	KARK	920	Terre Haute, Ind.	WBOW	1230
Louisville, Ky.	WAVE	970	Tulsa, Okla.	KVOO	1170
Mankato, Minn.	KYSM	1230	Wichita, Kans.	KANS	1240

11:30 A.M. MOUNTAIN STANDARD TIME

Albuquerque, N.M.	KOB	1030	Phoenix, Ariz.	KTAR	620
Billings, Mont.	KGHL	790	Pocatello, Ida.	KSEI	930
Boise, Ida.	KIDO	1380	Safford, Ariz.	KGLV	1450
Bozeman, Mont.	KRBM	1450	Salt Lake City, Utah	KDYL	1320
Butte, Mont.	KGIR	1370	Tucson, Ariz.	KVOA	1290
Denver, Colo.	KOA	850	Twin Falls, Ida.	KTFI	1270
Helena, Mont.	KPFA	1240	Yuma, Arizona	KYUM	1240

10:30 A.M. PACIFIC STANDARD TIME

Fresno, Cal.	KMJ	580	San Francisco, Cal.	KPO	680
Los Angeles, Cal.	KFI	640	Seattle, Wash.	KOMO	950
Medford, Ore.	KMED	1440	Spokane, Wash.	KHQ	590
Portland, Ore.	KGW	620			

STATIONS CARRYING ROUND TABLE BY TRANSCRIPTION

Cincinnati, Ohio	WSAI	1360	10:30 P.M. E.S.T
Honolulu, T.H.	KGU	760	

War against the Middle Classes?

A UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO ROUND TABLE BROADCAST

JUNE 8, 1941

PETER F. DRUCKER, Lecturer, and Professor of Economics at Sarah Lawrence College

MAYNARD C. KRUEGER, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Chicago

(THIRD PARTICIPANT TO BE ANNOUNCED)

SUGGESTED READINGS

COREY, LEWIS, *The Crisis of the Middle Class.* New York: Covici-Friede, 1935.

DRUCKER, PETER F., "War against the Middle Classes," *Saturday Evening Post,* August 10, 1940.

MOLEY, RAYMOND, "Sprained Ankle or Broken Neck?" *Newsweek,* March 31, 1941.

PRINTED IN U.S.A.